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HAS WYOMING A PROBLEM IN JUDICIAL SELECTION?
BURTON S. HILL*

During colonial times in this country England provided the colonies
with judges selected under its appointive system. For the selection of its
own judges it had been using the same system for centuries. But it was
not a new system even when England commenced using it. The system
was then as old as history itself. It was virtually the same system recognized
by King Hammurabi, the great Babylonian law-giver, about B. C. 2100.
For when his other duties became too arduous to hear cases himself, and
when he became dissatisfied with the royal priests as dispensers of justice,
he sought men learned in the law. These men he appointed judges and
bade them hold court at the great gate and in the market places of Babylon.
Here his courts were accessible to the people.'
And, as related in an article by Glen R. Winters, Editor of the Journal
2
of the American Judicature Society, the system was still in effect seven
centuries later by wise King Haramhab, ruler of the Nile. As Egypt flourished under Haramhab he eventually learned his many pressing duties
would not permit him to hear legal cases. But he solved the world-old
problem by appointing competent judges. "I have sailed and traveled
throughout the land," he wrote in his often quoted edict, "I have sought
out two judges perfect in speech, excellent in character, skilled in penetrating the innermost thoughts of men, and acquainted with the procedure
of the palace and the laws of the court. I have set them one in each of
the two capitol cities, North and South." Further he said, "And I the
king have decreed this, that the laws of Egypt may be bettered, and that
3
suitors may not be oppressed."
Two hundred years later, after Moses had delivered the Children of
Israel from the harsh rule of the Pharaoes, he became over-wrought with
his responsibilities as their leader. It was then his wise father-in-law,
Jethro, said unto him, "The thing that thou doest is not good. Thou wilt
surely wear away, both thou and this people that is with thee, for this
thing is too heavy for thee; thou are not able to perform it thyself alone."
And Moses harkened unto Jethro and selected wise judges to administer
justice. Those he appointed judged the people at all seasons, and brought
4
only the very important cases to Moses.
'* Vice President of the Wyoming State
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Bar, practicing in Buffalo, Woming.
John H. Wigmore, "A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems," Vol. 1, p. 73.
Hereafter referred to as "Wigmore".
Glen R. Winters, Secretary-treasurerof The American Judicature Society, "Selection
and Tenure of Judges," appearing in The Legal Intelligencer, Philadelphia, June
13, 1947, being an address delivered before the sixty-fifth annual meeting of
the Bar Association of the State of Kansas, Jayhawk Hotel, Topeka, May 23, 1947.
Hereafter referred to as "Winters, Selection and Tenure". The writer is indebted
to Mr. Winters for many timely suggestions during the preparation of this article.
Wigmore, 15.
Wigmore, 109, Bible, Exodus, Ch. 18.
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At a later period the Jewish people came successively under the suzerainty of Persian, Greek, and Roman rulers. They maintained, however,
a highly developed judiciary. Its high court, which adhered only to a
senate called the Great Synhedrion, selected its judges and supervised its
courts. Courts were set up in every town and village. Each judge had his
assistant or junior, and as vacancies occurred the juniors were often appointed to take the judge's place. 5
Under the Greeks a lay jury system appeared which was responsible
for the administration of justice. There were no presiding judges. Therewere, however, magistrates learned in the law who supervised the proceedings. They held their positions by appointment from the state, but
the citizens of the whole courts were judges of law and fact. After the
evidence was in, and the speeches were made, without further deliberation
each member of the court cast his ballot in a verdict urn and departed. 6
But at a later period under the Roman emperors lay juries disappeared.
Most trials, both civil and criminal, took place under a single judge, or
praetor, who was of senatorial rank. His appointment came from the
emperor, to whom he adhered closely. The emperor occasionally heard
and decided cases himself, but every provincial city, from Britain to
7
Palestine had its own praetor subject to the emperor's prescripts.
Following the same familiar pattern, the early kings of England themselves were also judges. They were the fountain of English justice and
held court in the Royal Palace. They alone decided questions of law
and fact, and passed judgment in both civil and criminal cases in a court
known as the Curia Regis, or King's Bench. 8 But during the reign of
Henry II, as it had been with Hammurabi, Haremhab, Moses, the Jews, the
Greeks and the Romans, the King's sovereign duties became too burdensome
to hear cases. Thereupon, the king decided to send judges out into the
various counties to hear cases. These judges were of course chosen by the
Crown. Men of learning and with judicial ability were selected for these
high positions. And, in the hands of an able and conscientious ruler,
judicial selections were so well made that in the early period of the
British Empire the system became established. Yet, even so, improvements and betterments became necessary when it was learned that some
judges appeared willing to cooperate with a scheming and capricious
ruler. Moreover, before the Act of Settlement of 1700 English judges
were dependent upon the king for their salaries and tenure in office. This
so influenced their decisions that by the Act, it became the duty of the
Lord Chancellor to recommend the selection of judges. These selections
were made to the sovereign through the prime minister.9
5.
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Wigmore, 291.
Wigmore, 415.
Winters, Selection and Tenur.
"Elements of Judicial Selection," A. B. A. Journal, Vol. 24
Wormser, "The Law," pp. 249-252.
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As a consequence of this traditional method, which was the only one
known at the time, it may not appear surprising that following independence the American Government adopted the appointive system. For the
same reason several of the new states passed laws leaving the selection of
judges in the hands of their governors. Even though some of the royal
judges in the American colonies had been treacherous and unworthy, our
early law makers were not content to cast off the English system. However, as a result of many baneful experiences with the royal judges, both
the Federal Government and the state governments adopted safeguards.
This was done when the Constitution of this country provided for the
appointment of Federal judges by the president, by and with the consent
of the senate. And as for the states, judicial appointments were made
subject to the approval of some delegation or group of citizens. In Pennsylvania and Delaware this was the legislature. In Massachusetts, New
Hampshire and Maryland it was the governor's council, and in New York
a special council of appointment consisting of the governor and certain
members of the legislature.10
However, not all of the first colonies to attain statehood followed the
example of their sister states. It appears that a number of them considered
it wiser to entrust the selection of judges to the legislature. In this category were the states of Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, South
Carolina, Virginia and Vermont."
Of course, as might be expected, later changes were deemed necessary
in most of these states. As a consequence, all judges are now appointive
by the executive, subject to confirmation by a body such as the senate or
governor's council, in the District of Columbia (the same as all Federal
judges), Massachusetts and New Hampshire. The same is true with only
minor exceptions in Dilaware, Maine and New Jersey, while in Rhode
Island trial judges alone are so appointed. With these states may now be
included California and Missouri, since in recent years both have adopted
a composite plan, having many of the elements of an appointive system
later to be discussed. However, under these systems only appellate judges
and certain others are appointed under a modified plan. All remaining
12
judges are elected.
Also in this group should be included several other states where
various classes of judges are appointed, and som of considerable importance. In Florida, as one of these, circuit judges and judges of criminal
courts of record are appointed by the governor, subject to the confirmation of the senate. In Georgia the governor appoints some city court
judges. This is also true of judges of the municipal court of Indianapolis,
Indiana. City judges, magistrates, and some county judges are appointed
10.
11.
12.

Winters, Selection and Tenure.

"Judicial Selection Roundup," Jn. Am. J. Soc. 31, Dec. 1947, No. 4; Arthur T.
Vanderbilt, 'Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration," pp. 8-10. Hereafter
referred to as "Vanderbilt."
Vanderbilt, p. 6.
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in South Carolina, as well as municipal court judges in Vermont. In
Louisiana some of the municipal court judges are named by city councils,
and in New York judges of certain local courts are appointed by the mayor.
Also, the governor appoints members of the Court of Claims in New
York. And the same is also true of special superior court judges in North
Carolina. Likewise in Texas the three-judge elected Court of Criminal
Appeals may appoint a two-man commission of criminal appeals to assist
in its judicial business.
At the present time Connecticut judges are elected by the legislature
upon nomination of the governor, except probate judges and justices of the
peace. In Rhode Island the same is true of all appellate court justices. In
South Carolina all circuit judges and supreme court justices fall in this
category. In Vermont, judges of the supreme and superior courts are so
selected, and in Virginia, as for circuit and appellate court judges, the
system is similiar.18
The state of Georgia became the first to adopt the principle of popular
election of judges. The change occurred in 1793 when that state became
dissatisfied with the system of judicial appointment by the legislature.
However, during the succeeding thirty years many of the older states took
the same course. And, as the new states were admitted to the union
they all adopted the elective system. Although Mississippi resisted the
change, it finally discarded the appointive system and adopted the elective
system in 1832. The state of New York did likewise in 1846. Actually,
at the time the Civil War broke out, judges were elected in twenty states
of the then existing thirty-six. Today the elective system is employed in
14
thirty-eight out of the forty-eight states.
Whatever other causes may be assigned to have persuaded so many
of the states to adopt the elective system, it is generally conceded the
main cause was the so-called "Jacksonian Revolt." This took place in
the 1820's when Andrew Jackson, while president, popularized the election
of judges for short terms. It was his theory that a judiciary to serve during
good behavior should be supplanted by one where judges could be popularly elected through partisan nominations. He reasoned that terms
should be short out of deference to the new political doctrine of rotation
in office expressed in the slogan, "To the victor belongs the spoils."1 5
During the Jacksonian era lawyers had little standing and less popularity. Jackson adhered closely to the theory that all men are created
equal. He maintained that since lawyers were men, they all were on an
equal basis, so that no particular lawyer was any more entitled to be a
judge than any other, if the voters so willed. The qualifications of one
lawyer as compared to another was not considered as important. The
13.
14.
15.

Vanderbilt, pp. 8-9.
Winters, Selection and Tenure.
Vanderbilt, Introduction xxiii; Journal Am. Bar. Assn., Vol. 24, (1938) 542.
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important thing was to keep every judge "close to the people" by a system
of shorter terms so all might have a chance.' 6
Although the system of electing judges by popular ballot has been
employed in this country for more than a century, it has always had its
severe critics. Almost from the beginning it was found that many times
the best qualified individuals were not elected. And this often occurred
in the selection of judges for the highest positions where learning, judicial
temperment and profound integrity were vitally important. Moreover,
it was shown that too many times partisan politics played an important
roll in the elections of judges, and occasionally a sinister one." 7 This
especially has existed in some metropolitian areas where the candidates
have been little known to the electors. In these instances the candidate
with the most effective machine would usually win. His opponent may
have been the best qualified by standards of the better lawyers and the
bar association, but he may not have had the same personal appeal. In
many instances the high moral and professional standards of some candidates would not allow them to put on a spectacular and showmanlike
campaign like their opponents. As a consequence candidates have been
elected who were popular, but who lacked a knowledge of the law, and
other judicial qualifications' s
However, results have been much more favorable in the less metropolitan areas. Here the elective system stands in a more favorable light, since
in jurisdictions of less population the electors have a better opportunity
to become acquainted with the candidates. And of course when this
happens, they are less inclined to the alluring and persuasive appeal of
candidates more adept at politics than at the law. Yet in large centers
the electors may never even see the likeness of the various candidates
except by viewing their pictures tacked on a telephone pole. Then when
it comes ro election day they are confused by the long list of judicial candidates to select from on the ballot. 19
But in a state like Wyoming the aspirant for any judicial position
would no doubt be pretty well known everywhere. Moreover, the candidates would likely be so few in number for any judicial position that
even a casual inquiry would bring out the qualifications of all of them.
But whether it is in Wyoming, or in any jurisdiction where judges are
elected, from time to time even the best qualified and most respected incumbents and aspirants must stand election. To remain in office, even
those incumbents who have arrived at that enviable station where they
have little fear of succeeding elections must nevertheless occasionally test
16.
17.
18.
19.

Schlesinger, "The Age of Jackson," pp. 15-16 (1946); Vanderbilt, p. 4; Journal
A. B. C., "Elements of Judicial Selection, Vol. 24 (1938) 542.
"Let's Havc Competent Judges," The Reader's Digest, Nov. 1948; Robert N. Wilkin,
"The Error of Electing Judges," Tennessee Law Review, Vol. 14, pp. 528-534.
Duke Bar Assn. Journal, Vol. 8, (1940) 2; Justice Henry T. Lummus. "The Trial
Judge."
Lawrence M. Hyde, "Selection and Tenure of Judges," Journal A. B. A., Dec.
1941, pp. 763-765.
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the whim of the voters. And in such cases the incumbents must usually
depend upon the good will of particular lawyers, the political leaders, the
press, and the widespread publication of their names before the people.
This has caused some authorities to believe that such tactics must eventually
have some influence upon the judicial conduct of the judges seeking elec20
tion.
It is the view of many of these authorities that under the elective
system even the strongest and most virile character must sooner or later
allow his judicial action to be unwittingly guided by self interest. 21 Although, statistics carefully gathered, tend to bear out that elected judges
generally have the confidence of a great majority of the electors, and are
22
considered fair, honorable and unbiased.
However, the appointive system too, appears to have its imperfections, and its critics. While no doubt this system had generally produced
competent and upright Federal Judges during the past century and a half,
politics have nevertheless been in evidence. Senator Alexander Wiley,
as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee some time ago made public
a letter from Mr. Justice Tom Clark, then Attorney General, that of 231
Federal judges appointed since 1932, seventeen were Republicans and 214
were Democrats. Without regard to the competency of the appointees,
these figures must undoubtedly indicate that political alliance exercised
some influence in their selection. This of course is conclusively shown by
the rather insignificant minority identifed with the opposite party. And,
while figures do not appear to be available prior to 1932, it is reasonable
to conclude that in previous presidential administrations the preponderance of Republican appointees would be equally as noticable. 28
Of course, if these appointees have measured up to the high standards
ordinarily expected of Federal judges, there perhaps cannot be too much
complaint; but, this has not always been the case. It can hardly be gainsaid that today the United States Supreme Court fails to measure up to
its former prestige and elevation. And, moreover, if there is any deficiency
in its level of ability and high standard, it must mean that those making
the selections have been influenced by considerations other than professional qualifications. 24 In 1936 the late Judge Merrill E. Otis made a
speech in Boston where he cited some statistics which still remain unchallenged. His figures showed that the percentage of Federal judges
appointed since 1932 who were graduates of both college and law school
were less than half of what it was in the three preceding presidential
administrations. With no attempt to be partisan, this kind of evidence
indicates that professional qualifications have frequently been sacrificed
for other considerations. Since this can be true in any administration,
whether Democratic or Republican, the present method of appointing
Federal Judges of course is not ideal.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

John B. Waite, Conmittee Report to A. B. A.

"The Error of Electing Judges," supra, See 17.
Vanderbilt, p. 13 and notes.
Winters, Selection and Tenure.
Winters, Selection and Tenure.
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But the entire criticism of the Federal appointive system can not be
laid to faulty politics when we have no specified legal standards to measure
candidates for federal judgeships. And this likewise must hold true in
many of our state jurisdictions, yet in England a candidate must not only
be a barrister with wide experience, but must hold the rank of King's
Counsel. Since only barristers of the highest legal attainment are selected
for this coveted rank, it is almost certain that a judge selected from this
group will be well qualified.2 5 Moreover, recommendations must come
from the Lord Chancellor who is responsible for the high standard of the
English bench. And then his recommendations must be approved by
the Prime Minister before the Crown makes the appointment. 2 6
In France all judges are specially educated for the bench. When a
young man decides upon a legal career he must elect either to become
an advocate or a magistrate; and from then on he is trained according to
his selection in law school. When the student has been educated for the
bench, after law school he will first become the assistant to an experienced
magistrate. Later on he will probably be given a minor judgeship until
he is qualified for a better one; and, as he becomes experienced step by
27
step, he eventually will grown into one of the important judgeships.
This same system was used in Germany before the time of Hitler,28 and
may again be enforced in that country.
A somewhat similiar system was current in China, at least down
through the administration of Chiang Kai-shek. To become a judge
the aspirant was required to show a thorough legal training in a recognized
law school. He was then obliged to prove a sufficient number of years
in the practice of law to season him for a judgeship. This, however,
could be substituted for experience as an instructor in law, or for a
sufficient term as a legislator. Also, some of these preliminaries were
waived in case the aspirant had been an acknowledged legal authority.
Then with experiences in one of these categories he was required to
complete eighteen months in judicial training followed by a year29 of
probation. After this he might hope for an assignment on the bench.
And yet, the Constitution of the United States does not even require
that an appointee to the Supreme Court of the United States be a lawyer
in the sense that he is a member of the bar.8 0 But, of course, it is unlikely
that such an appointment would ever go to an individual not a member
of the bar somewhere nor one unqualified. Nevertheless, aside from the
fact that a judgeship of this nature presupposes a well qualified lawyer,
there are no fixed rules for measuring his legal ability, his judicial tem25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

William L. Burdick, "Bench and Bar of Other Lands," p. 78.
Thomas R. Robinson, "Selection of Judges," Conn. Bar Journal, Vol. 15.
Burdick, pp. 258-266.
Thomas R. Robinson, supra, sec. 26.
Tsao Hwa Loh, "Judicial Appointive System in China and How it Operates,"
The Panel, Jan. 1945.
Constitution of the U. S., Art. 3,Sec. 1.
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perment, nor his talent to do the work required.
holds true as to many of our state constitutions.

And the same situation

Still, with any imperfections it may have, our appointive system for
the Federal judiciary has never been radically changed by the law makers
of this country. The same quite generally holds true for those states
retaining the appointive system. This is especially true of Massachusetts
where the system has been considered the most ideal. But even so,
definite attempts have been made to change it. In 1922 a strong effort
was made to gain an amendment to the state constitution providing for
the election of judges, but it was thoroughly defeated. Again in 1937
it was under fire by reason of the large number of judicial appointments
being made by Governor Charles F. Hurley to fill vacancies. But once
more, the attempt failed. 3 l In an article concerning this situation the
prevailing opinion was well expressed by Joseph H. Cinamon. He pointed
out that by filling so many vacancies by popular election an unsightly
and an unsavory scramble might have been the result. He contended
convincingly that men of questionable fitness could well have been elected,
and that judicial dignity and merit would have been supplanted by
"political fanfare." The well known fact to every lawyer that Massawould appear to bear out
chusetts has an exceptionally high judiciary,
32
views.
author's
this
of
righteousness
the
But whether the elective system for the judiciary has been satisfactory
in those states employing it might well enough be brought out by its
record. At least it appears certain that the numerous methods of electing
judges would show that as a system it has not entirely filled all the requirements. A review of these various methods shows that as a result of legislation in recent years, appellate judges are appOinted in California and
Missouri, but most trial judges are still elected by popular ballot. Only
probate judges and justices of the peace are elected in Connecticut, and
in Florida this is the situation with supreme court justices, county judges,
and justices of the peace. In Maine probate judges are popularly elected,
and so it is in New Jersey with certain surrogates. The same is true of
probate judges and some county judges in South Carolina, while in Vermont probate judges and two lay members of each county court are
popularly elected.3 3
Judges are nominated at a party primary in twenty-five states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho (justices -of
the peace and probate judges), Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine
(probate judges), Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri (trial judges), New
Jersey (surrogates), New Mexico, North Carolina,Ohio (some), Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee (customarily), Texas, Utah, Vermont (probate
4
judges) and West Virginia.8
31.
32.
33.
34.

Jn. Am. J. Soc., Aug. 1938, pp. 53-54.
The Law Society Journal, Vol. VII, Nov. 1937, No. 8, pp. 1053-1054.
Vanderbilt, Judicial Selection, (d), p. 10.
Vanderbilt, Judicial Selection, (E), pp. 10-11.
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At party conventions judicial nominations are made in five states:

Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan and New York. But in Ohio most
judges seek election on a non-partisan basis by filing nominating petitions;
and in Wisconsin the only nomination of judges authorized is by a nonpartisan nominating paper. In the following six states judges very often
receive bipartisan endorsement: Idaho, Kansas (districts courts), LouisAt times
iana, Maryland, New York, and Vermont (probate judges).
this is also true in twelve states: Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas
(other than district courts), Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah and Wyomine
Judges are elected at a general election in all but four where the
elective system is in force: Illinois, Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
But in these states, and in eleven others, separate ballots known as nonpartisan ballots are used. They are: Arizona, California,Idaho, Maryland,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
5
South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming.
In only two states using the elective system is the bar formally
consulted concerning the nomination of judges. This takes place in some
sections of Illinois and New York. However, in twenty states the bar is
informally consulted regarding judicial nominations, or makes its opinion
known by polls or resolutions. These are: Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, MississOhio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
ippi, Nebraska, North Dakota,
36
Washington.
Texas, and
In the opinion of representative judges, lawyers, and law school professors from the appointive jurisdictions, 82% appear to be generally
satisfied with their trial judges. The same group on the whole appeared
to be somewhat more satisfied that their appellate judges were fair, impartial and not subject to political or personal influence. However, in
several of these jurisdictions it was considered that the appellate judges
in none of them was
lacked a sufficiently high standard of learning. 3But
7
favored.
judges
of
election
popular
of
the system
Of a similar group from the elective jurisdictions, 78% appeared to
be satisfied with their trial judges. In the same group from seventeen
of these states, 93% were satisfied with their appellate judges; but in
Alabama, Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada, and New Mexico, the percentage was
only 53%. And in Aizona, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi,
ss
Texas, Washington and Wyoming the percentage was 72%.
However, in virtually all states where judges are elected, statutes
provide the executive power to fill vacancies by ad interim appointments.
35.

Same as 34.

36.
37.
38.

Vanderbilt, p. 12.
Vanderbilt, Judicial Selection, (A), p. 12. See also notes 34 to 39.
Vanderbilt, see notes 40 to 44 under (A), p. 12.
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This, of course, should definitely be taken into consideration when judging
the merits of the elective system in those states where interim selections
are lawful. Such a situation may well be the difference as to whether or
not the elective system is workable and satisfactory in these jurisdictions.
As a matter of fact it is conceded by some very competent authority that
the elective system would have been found unworkable long ago except
for the ameliorating influence of interim appointments by the governor.
As a rule his selections are quite carefully considered. Very often the
bar in the district or circuit where a vacancy is to be filled is called upon
to assist, and as a result a well qualified and thoroughly competent lawyer
is usually selected. Customarily, such an appointee gives excellent service
during the balance of his predecessor's term, and he is often elected to a
full term of his own. Actually, the practical effect of this method is to
install the appointive system in all cases where judges must be selected
between elections. Of course, the appointee must afterwards be elected,
but the fact that he has first been appointed gives him a tremendous
advantage over his opponents. 39
In the State of Wyoming, all the Supreme Court judges were originally
appointed to fill vacancies left by death or resignation. But since then
all have been relected several times, and all have held office for over
twenty years. In three of the seven judicial districts the district judges
have been appointed to fill vacancies, and in one of these districts the
appointed judge has held office for not less than twenty years growing
out of subsequent elections. The remaining two appointments are recent
and have not yet experienced an election.
Yet, as state populations have increased and living has become more
complicated, many jurisdictions west of the Atlantic seaboard using the
elective system have continued to find serious fault with it. In a considerable number of our large western and southern cities it has become
apparent that in many cases judicial incumbents and new candidates are
wholly unknown at election time, and it has also become apparent that
capable lawyers have refused to enter the election scramble. These
lawyers appear to consider that their standings and reputations mean
more than to be thrown into competition with candidates of much less
standing, but frequently with more popular appeal. Moreover,. it has
become evident that good judicial candidates can not hope to bring a
campaign to a large group of voters without sacrificing considerable of
the dignity and decorum incident to a judicial office. Also, for many
in non-political elections,
years there has been an obvious lack of interest
40
population.
small
of
communities
even in
Gone ,is the time when a term of the district or circuit court in any
good-sized county seat was an event no local citizen wanted to miss.
39.
40.

Vanderbilt, Judicial Selection, under Appointment by the Executive (A), p. 6; also
under (B), p. 22.
Reader's Digest, Nov. 1948, supra.
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And gone also for the most part, is the keen interest in the court proceedings and trials, and in the judges and lawyers attending these terms.
In those old days the citizens generally knew all the lawyers in the district,
even in the large centers, which made it much easier to know whom to vote
for. And as a result good judges were usually elected. But today, the
great majority of the electors in these same communities take little interest
in the ordinary term of court. Even in the most rural communities only
the spectacular trials attract any attention whatever.
The same lack of interest in frequently evident in the election of
judges. Many of the voters pay but meager attention to the names on
the non-partisan ballot for any judgeship. And in the case of an election
for a judge of the appellate courts, few electors make any attempt to
learn about the candidate at all. This want of interest has often paved
the way for the aggressive lawyer-politician, better trained in the art of
getting votes, to win against his more earnest and well qualified opponent.
It is for these reasons that many of the states have been studying

and re-analyzing the original appointive system of our colonial forefathers.
But this research has generally led to some form of a composite system
which could embody the best elements of both the appointive and elective
systems. The states of California and Missouri have been pioneers in this
respect. Both of these states have adopted a composite system for the
A composite system has
appointment of judges of their higher courts.
People's Court in Maryland,
also been made effective for the Baltimore
41
which tribunal is of inferior jurisdiction.
California was the first to make the change from an elective system.
In 1934 it adopted a constitutional amendment under which justices of
the supreme court, and of its district courts of appeal, could be selected
by gubernatoral appointment. 42 But under the amendment all selections
are subject to confirmation by a commission which passes upon qualifications. The successful appointees are then retained in office as long
as the electors at periodical elections decide they should continue to serve.
Also, by the same constitutional amendment, this system may become
effective for the appointment of superior court judges in any counties
where the electors approve it by referendum.
The commission which passes on nominations made by the governor
is composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the presiding
judge of the District Court of Appeals in the district where the judge is
to serve, and the Attorney General. By the terms of the amendment, the
composition of the commission may be varied when the office of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court is vacant, or where other factors warrant
a different construction.
41.
42.

Report, Senator Norman C. Barry for Ill., Legislative Council (Proposal 265),
Selection of Judges, p. 12; Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 41A.
Constitution of California, Art VI, Sec. 26; also Art. VI, Sec. 3, p. 240, and Sec. 4A,
p. 242, Sec. 6, p. 246, Sec. 8, p. 246, and Sec. 9, p. 246.
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The California system is employed to fill vacancies on the appropriate
bench, whether they occur due to the death, resignation, unwillingness
to run for reelection, or the rejection at the polls of the candidate. After
an appointment is consummated, the name of the new judge is submitted
to popular election at the next general election to determine whether or
not he may be entitled to a full term. The basic term of higher court
judges is twelve years, and six years for others. An appointee who desires
a full term, or a sitting judge who would have another term, must file a
declaration of candidacy for election to succeed himself. His name is
then placed upon the general election ballot, with the title of the judgeship he wishes, and the electors vote "yes" or "no" on his candidacy.
He is opposed by no other candidate. If the vote is favorable the incumbent is given a full term, or succeeds himself to another term, as the case
43
may be. But if the vote is not favorable, another appointment is made.
However, the California plan was not an original idea at the time
of its adoption. As early as 1913 reform in the manner of selecting judges
had become a project of the American Judicature Society organized in
July of that year. At the time of the formation of the society, Albert K.
Kales, of the Northwestern University Law School, had become a member
of a committee of Judicial selection, and to him belongs much of the
credit leading to a solution. A few months later Kales published his
plan for selecting judges, which appeared first in the Annals of the
American Academy of Political Science, and later in the bulletins of the
American Judicature Society. His proposed methods took advantage of
the best features of both the appointive and elective systems, and eliminated the faults of both systems as nearly as possible. In fact, his plan was
in
not unlike that adopted in California by constitutional amendment
44
1934, lacking some of the refinements later worked out by him.
Finally, in 1937, the Kales Plan, then in more concise and concrete
form, was given the powerful support of the American Bar Association.
The text of hs plan as endorsed was as follows:
(a) The filling of vacancies by appointment by the executive or
other elective official or officials, but from a list named by
another agency, composed in part of high judicial officials
and in part by other citizens, selected for the purpose, who
hold no other public office.
(b) If further check upon appointment be desired, such check
may be supplied by the requirement of confirmation by the
State Senate or other legislative body of appointments and
made through the dual agency suggested.
(c) The appointee after a period of service should be eligible
for reappointment periodically thereafter, or periodically
go before the people upon his record, with no opposing
43.
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Winters, Selection and Tenure.

HAS

WYOMING

A

PROBLEM

IN

JUDICIAL

SELECrION?

candidate, the people voting upon
the question
'
Judge Blank be retained in office?"

"Shall

So far, only the State of Missouri has adopted the Kales Plan, or at
least this plan in substantial form. Shortly after the meeting of the
American Bar Association in 1937 when the plan was adopted, the Missouri
Bar Association commenced to study it. Missouri at the time was a
state where bosses ran the judges. One powerful politican boasted that
he personally elected the Circuit Court bench in St. Louis. Lawyers were
retained by their clients according to the influence they had with the
judges; and judges paid their political backers heavily to get on the bench.
So powerful had become the bosses that one judge of their choice was
actually a pharmacist who attended night law school. His only claim
to legal perfection was that he had filed eight suits for divorce and one
for annulment in the Missouri courts. But, with the backing of the political
bigwigs he was elected.
By 1940, the aroused Missouri citizens stumped the state for a change.
They obtained signatures, hung posters, put out hand bills, and kept
46
the slogan before the people: "Take the courts out of 'politics."
The Missouri Plan, as it has become known, won in the 1940 Missouri
election. In 1942 it won again when the politicians sought to upset it,
7
and was written into the new Missouri Constitution in 1945.4
Primarily, the Missouri Plan differs from the California System in
that action by a non-partisan judicial commission preceds, rather than
follows, the governor's action. In California the function of the commission is to confirm the governor's appointments, while in Missouri it
submits to the governor lists of nominees from which appointments are to be
made. Under the Missouri Plan there is one appellate judicial commission and a number of circuit court judicial commissions. In addition,
the commissions are so constructed that there can be no possibility of full
control by the governor through his appointments to these bodies.48
The appellate judicial commission is concerned with the selection of
judges to the supreme court and the three courts of appeal. It is composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who acts as chairman,
three lawyers, one elected by members of the bar from each of the three
appellate court districts, and three laymen. One layman is appointed from
each of the appellate court districts by the governor. Circuit Court judicial
commissions are concerned with the selection of judges in the circuit and
probate courts of the City of St. Louis and Jackson County (Kansas City).
This also includes the St. Louis Courts of Criminal Correction, which
were added by the terms of the new constitution; and also other courts
45.
46.
47.
48.

Resolution of House of Delegates, of A.B.A. recommending plan for selection and
tenure of judges - Columbus, Ohio, June 6, 1937.
Reader's Digest, supra.
Missouri Constitution (1945) Art. V. Secs. 29(a) to 2 9 (g), inclusive, pp. 86-90.
Norman C. Barry Report, supra, pp. 13-14.
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of record in any judicial circuits adopting the system.
Each circuit court judicial commission is composed of a chairman,
who is the presiding judge of the District Court of Appeals where most
of the population of the circuit is located, and four others. Two of these
are lawyers of the circuit elected by the circuit bar, and two are laymen
who reside in the circuit. These two are appointed by the governor.
Except for the chairman, the members of all commissions serve six
years. Their terms are staggered, and the commissioners are not eligible
to succeed themselves. These matters are set out according to Supreme
Court rules. Since the Missouri gubernatorial term is four years with
laws against reelection, no single governor can gain control of a commission through his own appointments. Moreover, the governor's lay
appointments constitute less than a majority of each commission. Members
of the commissions are allowed expenses but serve without compensation.
And, with the exception of the chairman, they are prohibited from holding
any public or political office in a political party.
When the governor makes his appointment from the list submitted
by the appropriate commission, the appointee serves as judge until the
next general election. At this election the people of the appropriate
jurisdiction vote on the question of retaining him in office. Very similiar
to the plan in California, they go to the polls with a single ballot, reading:
"Shall Judge (naming him) of (title of the court to be filled) be retained in office? Yes---. No---."
As in California, the judge must file a declaration of candidacy if he
desires to remain in office for a full term. He runs unopposed of course,
on a non-partisan type of ballot. Judges of the two higher courts serve
for terms of twelve years, circuit court judges for six years, and judges
of the other courts for terms of four years. If a judge fails to file his
declaration of candidacy, or is rejected at the polls, the governor makes
another appointment from the list submitted by the appropriate commission. All judges are prohibited from making political contributions or
from holding office in a political party. Moreover, they can take no
49
part in any political campaign.
In advocating the Missouri Plan, the Missouri Institute of Justice
claims it takes the courts out of politics and assures an independent judiciary. It further asserts that the system establishes a non-partisan method
of nominating judicial candidates, and eliminates the evils of the primary
system. Also that it establishes a non-partisan method of electing judges
at regular intervals, and makes it unnecessary for a judge to incur political obligations. It is said to insure careful consideration of the qualifications of judicial candidates before their names go on the ballot, and
to encourage competent lawyers to become judicial candidates who might
49.
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not otherwise submit themselves to the hazards and expenses of an election campaign. In addition, the voters' attention is focused on the record
of the judge, since he serves at least a year before being a candidate for
a regular term. This feature is claimed to make it easier to remove incompetents and retain the well qualified. Further, the claimis made, that the
system enables the judge to devote his entire time to his duties, without
having to plan for the next campaign for reelection. And, very important,
it promotes efficiency of the courts, and speeds up the administration
of justice.5 0
While neither the California nor the Missouri plans have been in
operation long enough to produce an accurate appraisal of them, greater
favor has been shown the Missouri System. Many members of the bar
have substantiated the views of the Missouri Institute of Justice, both in
speech and in writing. Many believe it is a decided improvement over the
elective system, and are convinced it does insure an independent judiciary
and the confidence of the people.
However, there are indications that the California System has been
something of a disappointment to many of its sponsors. No doubt, too
great an improvement was expected. The primary objection has been
that after all, until recently at least, the selection of judges has not been
entirely removed from politics. The reported reason for this condition
has been that the commission, a majority of whom owe their appointments
to the governor's office, tend to approve all his appointments. This situation caused a bill to be introduced in 1943 to abolish the system, but it was
not acted upon since the state bar promised to submit a remedial program. 51
The Missouri Plan has also come in for some criticism from those
have studied it. The chief objection has been that it tends to retain
in office most of the incumbents, when better men might be selected if
the incumbents could be more easily removed. At the same time, a large
number of lawyers have pointed out that over a period long enough this
situation will right itself. They believe it can not happen otherwise than
eventually suitable judges will replace the undesirable ones. However,
it has been definitely shown that a composite plan does actually provide
a great advantage for incumbents who seek reelection when compared
to what results might be expected under an elective system. But, under the
time-honored appointive system incumbents usually remain in office for
life. Consequently, the theory that incumbents remain too long under
50.
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Norman C. Barry Report, supra, p. 14; William Logan Martin, "Selection and
Tenure of Judges," 8 Ala. Lawyer, (1947) 131; John Perry Wood, "Missouri Victory
Speeds National Judicial Selection Reform," 26 Jn. Ant. J. Soc. (1942-43) 142;
William W. Crowdus, "The Operation of the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan,"
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the composite systems is perhaps not Well founded. No doubt these
theories are expressed in states where the elective system has become too
52
well established, and the constituents are used to a more frequent change.
Yet, while making due allowance for all the strong points of the
composite systems thus far in operation, they virtually reach only the
appellate courts and the large city courts of record of the two states using
them. Even the Baltimore People's Court, operating under a composite
system, has jurisdiction only in one of the largest cities in this country.
Moreover, up to the present time the composite systems of neither California nor Missouri have been adopted in any of the cities and less metropolitan jurisdictions. Even though the constitutions of each of these
states have provided for their adoption by referendum throughout every
jurisdiction of lesser population, none has complied. In fact, when extension of the California plan was attempted in Los Angeles County, it was
rejected. However, this is the only occasion where the question has
been presented to the electorate in any jurisdiction in either California
or Missouri. No particular explanation has ever been given for this situation, except that the fault may lie more in a lack of interest than because
of any inherent defect in the systems themselves. 53 But no doubt the
fact is that the electors were not ready to change from a well established
system to a new and virtually untried one-untried at least in small communities.
But in spite of the fact that neither California nor Missouri have
entirely adopted their respective composite systems, other states continue
to favor them. Sentiment has been expressed in twenty-three of those
states employing the elective system to abandon it in favor of the American
Bar Association plan as exemplified in Missouri. In about half these
particular states, however, the sentiment is still that of a minority group.
At the same time there are active movements favoring the plan in Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and
4
Wisconsin.5
The State of Wyoming is classed among those showing some sentiment
favoring the Missouri Plan, but so far it does not appear to be very outspoken. 55 Undoubtedly, for reasons previously expressed, it has long ago
been determined that a composite system in Wyoming would be of little
value. Our Bar is so small and all its members are so well known that
a poor interim appointment would seldom be likely, Moreover, if such
a plan were adopted it would mean a constitutional amendment, and that
might be slow in coming. There has been so little complaint concerning
the quality of our judges, either of the appellate or of the trial bench,
52. Norman C. Barry Report, supra, p. 17, under Lawyer Poll on Composite System.
53. Norma C. Barry Report, supra, p. 16, under Other Evaluations.
54. Vanderbilt, "Judicial Selection," under (B), p. 15.
55 Vanderbilt, under (B), p 15 and note 44.
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that the electors would probably not take the change seriously. At all
events, experience in other states of small population and a small Bar
has borne out this theory.
Yet, even in a state like Wyoming there can be do doubt that the
nominating commission under a composite system could be of considerable
value to its citizens. It might be effectively shown that since most of our
judges are originally appointed, the governor could be relieved of a great
single responsibility, and would welcome such assistance.
Moreover, without the worry, expense and inconvenience of a periodical
election campaign, our judges could go about their judicial duties with
a greater feeling of security and independence. And besides, a composite
system would help to provide the same competent and thoroughy scrupulous judges we have thus far been fortunate in having. Knowing that
the political scramble would be eliminated under the Kales plan, it is
more likely that we would continue to have the better type of lawyers
seeking our important judgeships.
Of course, while the Kales plan is being advocated, there are those
who claim the professional groups are maneuvering a return to the
Guild System of by-gone ages. They maintain that the old freedom and
fluidity is passing, and that tight lines are being drawn in an attempt to
gain monopolistic control in all the professions. It is the view of some
that the legal profession is definitely headed in that direction. They
argue that any composite plan is but an additional means to further
exclude the public from any rights it might have to set standards and
control methods of practice. They urge that a new judge should go into
office responsible only to the people of the district to which he belongs,
and not to a professional guild. In short, this group disagrees with the
preunise that the functions of the courts are such that the judges should
be entirely free from politics.

56

Yet, it is possible that those who have these views misconceive the
essential functions of a court, since a court's purpose is not always to give
effect to the popular will. While undoubtedly the popular will may at
times be vindicated by a court decree, at other times the righteous declaring of a law may not be at all popular. Occasionally it is the duty of a
court to find unconstitutional some popular act of the legislature. Then
sometimes it becomes the court's obligation to check the authority of
some powerful group, or to bring candor where emotions have before
and functions of our courts
existed. It is for these reasons that the duties
57
should be independent of popular pressure.
Also, the many problems pertaining to proper judicial salaries, and
56.
57.
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of retirement in case of sickness or old age could better be solved under
the Kales plan. Moreover, these particular essentials may be additional
means of always securing the services of the best qualified lawyers for
the bench. Often this has not been the case under the elective system in
many jurisdictions, although not particularly in Wyoming. At all events,
it stands to reason that competent lawyers might be reluctant to give up
their well established and lucrative law practices for the chance of a
few years on the bench. But, with the election hazards removed, and
the assurance of a reasonably long tenure in office, followed by adequate
retirement, a qualified lawyer might be more inclined to accept a judicial
position. 58
Still, as frequently intimated, without a composite plan the trend
in Wyoming is definitely away from the once popular doctrine espoused
by President Jackson a century ago. The method of electing judges is
now on a non-partisan basis; judicial salaries have been recently raised, 59
and interim appointments have been assuring us of good judges who hold
office a considerable length of time.
However, after the composite plans advanced by Kales have become
better assured by longer usage, they may appear more practical for
jurisdictions of lesser population. This era may not arrive in the near
future, but scholars believe it is on the way. 60 The trend throughout
the Nation is becoming more opposed to the Jacksonian doctrine of short
judicial terms and popular election of judges. The traditional appointive
system inherited from England by the Federal Government and the original
states may never wholly supplant the elective system, but the Kales Plan
will. It is entirely possible that the people of Wyoming will eventually
adopt such a plan.
58.
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